Abstract: This paper proposes an algorithm for oblivious transfer using elliptic curves. Also, we present its application to chosen one-out-of-two oblivious transfer.
Introduction
An oblivious transfer scheme is a protocol in which a sender sends a message to a receiver with some fixed probability between 0 and 1 without the sender knowing whether or not the receiver received the message. The idea was introduced in 1981 by Michael Rabin [1] , [2] .
Rabin developed a solution to the problem of mutual exchange of secrets between two distrustful parties. For example, Alice and Bob have secrets S A and S B , respectively, which they wish to exchange (S A may be the password to a file that Bob wants and vice versa). The problem is to establish a protocol without a trusted third party and without simultaneous exchange of messages.
Rabin exploited the fact that a square transformation , , and are primes, results in two or four messages being mapped to a single cipher. Hence, using Rabin's protocol, Alice would convey the factors of (assuming Alice is using a public key encryption method of the form , where is the encryption exponent) without knowing for sure whether Bob received the factors or not. In other words, Bob may or may not receive the factors, each happening with probability onehalf. In this paper we introduce an oblivious transfer protocol using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), a fast upcoming competitor against RSA. We use exactly the same set up as described in [2] . We present an algorithm that achieves oblivious transfer between two parties using elliptic curves for encryption of their messages. Section 2 discuses the basics of elliptic curve cryptography. Section 3 introduces the key observation that led to the idea of oblivious transfer and Section 4 presents our algorithm together with an illustrative example. Section 5 presents an application of our oblivious transfer algorithm to chosen one-out-of-two oblivious transfer.
Basics of elliptic curves
An elliptic curve used for cryptographic purposes is defined as follows:
(1) where and b are integer constants. The set of points is a set of all and satisfying (1) .
For an elliptic curve over a finite field , we use the cubic equation (1) 
for cryptographic applications over finite fields. This set of points is denoted as . The order of a point
on an elliptic curve is defined as the smallest positive integer n such that 0 = nG . Point G is called the base point in and is picked such that its order is a very large value.
The security of ECC arises from the fact that for kP Q = , where and , it is easy to calculate given the values of and , but it is relatively very hard to determine given the values of and
A standard elliptic curve transfer proceeds as follows: the first task in this system is to encode the plain text message to be sent as a m x y − point . It is the point that will be encrypted as cipher-text and subsequently decrypted. We cannot simply encode the message as the or 
The Proposed Algorithm
Our aim is to allow exchange of secret S A and S B between two parties A and B without using a trusted third party and without simultaneous exchange. Here, we do not go into the details of signing the messages using ECC and take it for granted that all the messages are signed.
Both A and B select a common elliptic curve . This information is public. They then decide upon one -coordinate. Let the two points corresponding to thiscoordinate be and , whereupon by symmetry
The -coordinate is also public knowledge. Since, A and B have not decided upon which -coordinate to use, we will denote A's choice of point as and B's choice as , such that
Even though the -coordinate is common, neither party knows what is the final point chosen by the other because there are two possible -coordinates to choose from.
x y
Now, let A choose a secret key , which she wishes to use for encryption of her messages, with the aim of obliviously conveying this secret key to B. Also, we assume that a procedure for mapping of to a point on elliptic curve has been predecided. We call the point on our elliptic curve, corresponding to , as . 
The sequence of steps presented above achieves our goal of oblivious transfer. The two cases that arise in such a transfer are B A P P = and B A P P ≠ . We discuss these two cases below and show how the algorithm given above achieves our goal.
The difference between the two cases arises from step 3. Hence, we analyze them step 3 onwards.
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Case I:
Case II:
In this case, we note that . Therefore, the results are as follows:
Once the receiver knows , he can deduce from it. Therefore, this point forward we refer to as . with probability one-half, B receives the secret key with probability one-half. 
A P n
In a similar manner, B transfers its secret key to A with probability one-half. Once this transfer has been achieved we can follow similar step proposed in [2] in order to prevent cheating by either of the parties during exchange of information. Here, we present these steps, adapting them to suit elliptic curve transfers. We define the state of knowledge of the secret keys as follows: S k ⊕ Note that the above two steps do not provide either party any information about other's secret. Now, A may transfer its secret to B using an elliptic curve cryptographic transfer. However, A will encode the secret using its own secret key and not the public key of the other party, as is usually done in a standard elliptic curve transfers; G is the base point with large order. Thus, A can do and thus obtain . The probability, when the protocol is completed, that neither one knows other's secret is one-quarter. 
. We do not explore the details of its mapping of to the elliptic curve and just refer to it as . In turn, let B chooses a secret number and a random point . Now we execute our algorithm by considering the two cases separately: 
B sends to A:
4. A sends to B:
The above example makes the working of our algorithm clear.
Chosen one-out-of-two oblivious transfer
The chosen one-out-of-two oblivious transfer, -OT for short, is an important application of the basic oblivious transfer protocol. In this transfer, the sender sends two secrets and and the receiver's input is choice bit c ; the latter then learns but gets no information about other secret . This transfer has been implemented using exponentiations. Here we show that the oneout-of-two oblivious transfer can be implemented using the algorithm we presented.
We assume that both parties are willing to take part in the protocol honestly, i.e. A is willing to disclose one out of two secrets that it has to B, but B does not want A to know which one secret it wants to know. Also, B should learn only the one secret it wants to know and nothing about the other.
A is said to have two secrets and . A, associates two different secret keys with each of them. These secret keys will be used to encrypt and when transferring them to B. B must be able to retrieve only one of these two secrets and A should not come to know, what B has extracted. 
From
, B can easily calculate . The second pair of points will not yield any key.
Thus, B can get only one of the two secret keys and A remains oblivious to the fact that which of the two keys did B retrieve. and hence obtain . It will not be able to get any information from the second half of the message about secret . A does not know which of the two secrets did B obtain. We have achieved our goal of chosen one-out-of-two oblivious transfers. 
Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced the idea of oblivious transfer to elliptic curves and presented an algorithm for its implementation. Also, we have shown how it can be applied to the traditional problem of -OT.
The algorithm presented here may be expressed in different variants. The key contribution is the introduction of oblivious transfer to ECC. The one-out-of-two oblivious transfer may be further modified in order to obtain 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer.
